Family Control and Corporate Social Responsibility

53 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2015 Last revised: 29 Oct 2020

See all articles by Sadok El Ghoul

Sadok El Ghoul

University of Alberta - Campus Saint-Jean

Omrane Guedhami

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business

Chuck C.Y. Kwok

University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business

He (Helen) Wang

West Virginia University - Department of Finance

Date Written: January 24, 2016

Abstract

We investigate the impact of family control on corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. Using newly collected data on the ultimate ownership structure of publicly traded firms in nine East Asian economies, we find that family-controlled firms exhibit lower CSR performance, consistent with the expropriation hypothesis of family control. The negative relationship between family control and CSR is robust to alternative measures of family control, different components of CSR, as well as to endogeneity tests, subsample tests, and alternative estimation methods. We further find that CSR underperformance concentrates in family firms with greater agency problems and in countries with weaker institutions. Moreover, the underperformance of East Asian family firms holds when controlling for the effects of other large shareholders and when comparing with family firms from other countries. These findings contribute to understanding the determinants of CSR and highlight the importance of corporate governance and the institutional environment in improving CSR performance of family-controlled firms.

Keywords: Family control, corporate social responsibility (CSR), agency theory, institutions, East Asia

JEL Classification: G32, G34, M14

Suggested Citation

El Ghoul, Sadok and Guedhami, Omrane and Kwok, Chuck C.Y. and Wang, He, Family Control and Corporate Social Responsibility (January 24, 2016). Journal of Banking and Finance, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2623246 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2623246

Sadok El Ghoul (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Campus Saint-Jean ( email )

Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R3
Canada
780-465-8725 (Phone)
780-465-8760 (Fax)

Omrane Guedhami

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business ( email )

Columbia, SC
United States

Chuck C.Y. Kwok

University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business ( email )

1705 College St
Francis M. Hipp Building
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
803-777-3606 (Phone)
803-777-3609 (Fax)

He Wang

West Virginia University - Department of Finance ( email )

Morgantown, WV 26506
United States

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