Law and Custom on the Federal Open Market Committee

32 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2015  

David T. Zaring

University of Pennsylvania - Legal Studies Department

Date Written: June 27, 2015

Abstract

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which controls the supply of money in the United States, may be the country’s most important agency. But there has been no effort to come to grips with its administrative law; this article seeks to redress that gap. The principal claim is that the FOMC’s legally protected discretion, combined with the imperatives of bureaucratic organization in an institution whose raison d’etre is stability, has turned the agency into one governed by internally developed tradition in lieu of externally imposed constraints. The article evaluates how the agency makes decisions through a content analysis of FOMC meeting transcripts during the period when Alan Greenspan served as its chair, and reviews the minimal legal constraints on its decisionmaking doctrinally.

JEL Classification: Regulated Industries and Administrative Law, Finance

Suggested Citation

Zaring, David T., Law and Custom on the Federal Open Market Committee (June 27, 2015). Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 78, No. 3, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2624111

David T. Zaring (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Legal Studies Department ( email )

3730 Walnut Street
Suite 600
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
91
Rank
234,412
Abstract Views
537