Large Spatial Competition

27 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2015 Last revised: 9 May 2016

See all articles by Matias Nuñez

Matias Nuñez

Université Paris Dauphine

Marco Scarsini

LUISS, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza

Date Written: May 09, 2016

Abstract

We consider spatial competition when consumers are arbitrarily distributed on a compact metric space. Retailers can choose one of finitely many locations in this space. We focus on symmetric mixed equilibria which exist for any number of retailers. We prove that the distribution of retailers tends to agree with the distribution of the consumers when the number of competitors is large enough. The results are shown to be robust to the introduction of (i) randomness in the number of retailers and (ii) different ability of the retailers to attract consumers.

Keywords: Hotelling games, large games, Poisson games, valence

JEL Classification: C72, R30, R39

Suggested Citation

Nuñez, Matias and Scarsini, Marco, Large Spatial Competition (May 09, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2624304 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2624304

Matias Nuñez (Contact Author)

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

Marco Scarsini

LUISS, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza ( email )

Viale Romania 32
Rome, RM 00197
Italy

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