Two-Sided Altruism and Signaling

19 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2015 Last revised: 23 Sep 2021

See all articles by Garance Genicot

Garance Genicot

Georgetown University - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 2015


This paper shows that when donors and recipients care about each other --two-sided altruism -- the presence of asymmetry of information about the donor's income leads very naturally to a signaling game. A donor who cares about the recipient's welfare has incentives to appear richer than he is when the recipient cares about him. Similarly, asymmetry of information regarding the donor's income generates a signaling game in the presence of two-sided altruism. These signaling games put upward pressure on transfers and this pressure increases with the altruism of the recipient.

Suggested Citation

Genicot, Garance, Two-Sided Altruism and Signaling (June 2015). Available at SSRN:

Garance Genicot (Contact Author)

Georgetown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-7144 (Phone)
202-687-6102 (Fax)


Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics