Can Auditors Predict the Choices Made by Other Auditors?

Journal of Accounting Research Vol 39 (3): 569-583, 2001

University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2013-694

29 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2001 Last revised: 11 Jun 2013

See all articles by Karim Jamal

Karim Jamal

University of Alberta - Department of Accounting, Operations & Information Systems

Hun-Tong Tan

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 1, 2000

Abstract

An implicit assumption of prior literature on strategic behavior of auditors is that auditors know the preferences of their colleagues. In this study, we conduct an experiment to investigate the validity of this assumption. In our experiment, we match a manager with a pair of top and mediocre audit seniors, as assessed by their firm. Each auditor predicts the choices that will be made by other auditors on two tasks that differ in their level of ambiguity. Our results show no difference in the accuracy among managers, top seniors, and mediocre seniors when they predict the choices made by specific individual auditors for both tasks. When predicting the number of managers and seniors who will choose a specific option on the high-ambiguity task, managers outperform top seniors, who in turn outperform mediocre seniors. For the low-ambiguity task, we find no difference among managers, top seniors, and mediocre seniors. Our results provide some limited support for models of strategic auditor behavior, and indicate that the ability to predict the choices of others is a dimension of an auditor's expertise.

Keywords: Audit expertise, Strategic auditor behavior, Auditor preference

JEL Classification: M49

Suggested Citation

Jamal, Karim and Tan, Hun-Tong, Can Auditors Predict the Choices Made by Other Auditors? (June 1, 2000). Journal of Accounting Research Vol 39 (3): 569-583, 2001, University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2013-694, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=262484 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.262484

Karim Jamal (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Department of Accounting, Operations & Information Systems ( email )

Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada
780-492-5829 (Phone)
780-492-3325 (Fax)

Hun-Tong Tan

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University ( email )

Singapore, 639798
Singapore
+65 6790 4819 (Phone)
+65 6793 7956 (Fax)

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