Managerial Cost Inefficiency and Takeovers of U.S. Thrifts

Abstract

This paper uses a two-step methodology to examine the relationship between managerial cost inefficiency and the takeover of U.S. thrifts during a period of market liberalization and widespread takeover activity, 1994 to 2000. In the first stage using stochastic cost frontiers, controllable managerial cost inefficiency scores are estimated for all stock firms operating each year in 1994 to 2000. In a second stage, these scores are used to examine correlates of takeovers, focusing on cost inefficiency. For takeovers by banks, a significant negative relationship between cost inefficiency and takeover is found, suggesting an exit of more cost efficient firms from the thrift industry during this period. However, takeovers by thrifts are associated with other characteristics.

Keywords: depository institutions, thrifts, takeovers and cost inefficiency

JEL Classification: G21, G33, G34