Valuing Control

49 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2015

Date Written: June 30, 2015


Control over property is valuable in and of itself. Scholars have not fully recognized or explored that straightforward premise, which has profound implications for the economic analysis of property rights. A party to a property dispute may actually prefer liability-rule protection for an entitlement resting with the other party to liability-rule protection for an entitlement resting with her. This Article presents a novel economic model that determines the conditions under which that is the case — by taking account of how parties value control. The model suggests new opportunities for policymakers to resolve conflicts and to develop better information about property disputes through policy experiments. The Article provides recommendations for implementing this new approach and suggests applications in the areas of copyright, trademark, patent, and privacy law.

Keywords: Property Rights, Intellectual Property, Copyright Law, Patent Law, Trademark Law, Privacy Law, Law and Economics, Property Rules and Liability Rules

JEL Classification: K10, K30, D23, K11, O34

Suggested Citation

DiCola, Peter C., Valuing Control (June 30, 2015). 113 Michigan Law Review 663 (2015), Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 15-11, Available at SSRN:

Peter C. DiCola (Contact Author)

Northwestern University School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

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