'Facta Non Verba': An Experiment on Pledging and Giving

30 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2015

See all articles by Gilles Grolleau

Gilles Grolleau

Montpellier SupAgro and Researcher at LAMETA

Guillermo Matteu

Université de Bourgogne - Burgundy School of Business

Angela Sutan

LESSAC, Burgundy School of Business

Radu Vranceanu

ESSEC Business School; University of Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA

Date Written: June 18, 2015

Abstract

This paper builds an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (to pledge) can increase their actual donation. Individuals’ endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely private, public and irrevocable ones, which differ in individual cost of not keeping a promise. Public pledges appear to be associated to lower donation levels. Irrevocable pledges ensure an amount of donations equal to donations in absence of pledges. Moreover, a significant number of individuals keep their promises, in presence of either private or public pledges. A higher risk attached to the endowment increases donations.

Keywords: Charity giving, Pledge, Commitment, Communication, Experiments

JEL Classification: C91, D03, D64

Suggested Citation

Grolleau, Gilles and Matteu, Guillermo and Sutan, Angela and Vranceanu, Radu, 'Facta Non Verba': An Experiment on Pledging and Giving (June 18, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2626326 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2626326

Gilles Grolleau (Contact Author)

Montpellier SupAgro and Researcher at LAMETA ( email )

France

Guillermo Matteu

Université de Bourgogne - Burgundy School of Business ( email )

29 rue Sambin
Dijon, 21006
France

Angela Sutan

LESSAC, Burgundy School of Business ( email )

29 rue Sambin
Dijon, 21000
France

Radu Vranceanu

ESSEC Business School ( email )

3, Av. Bernard Hirsch
PB 50105
Cergy-Pontoise, 95021
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.essec.fr

University of Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA ( email )

33 boulevard du port
F-95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, 95011
France

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