Mixed Motives in the Equilibrium View of Joint Intention
Philosophical Studies, vol. 173 no. 3, p. 733-755, 2015
23 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2015 Last revised: 6 Sep 2016
Date Written: June 10, 2015
We develop a theory of joint intention in contexts in which participants have mixed motives that can manifest in all-things-considered reasons to deviate from contributing to the desired project, e.g., contexts with collective action problems. Our theory is based on strategic equilibrium-based reasoning, which links the characterization of joint intention in terms of individual intentions with conditions on strategy profiles of the underlying strategic games. We use elements of equilibrium reasoning to construct a counterfactual account of joint intention in the mixed-motive contexts, which extends the reach of the notion of joint intention considerably beyond that of previous formulations.
Keywords: joint intention, equilibrium, collective action problems
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