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Mixed Motives in the Equilibrium View of Joint Intention

Philosophical Studies, vol. 173 no. 3, p. 733-755, 2015

23 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2015 Last revised: 6 Sep 2016

Nicholas Almendares

Seton Hall Law School

Dimitri Landa

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics

Date Written: June 10, 2015

Abstract

We develop a theory of joint intention in contexts in which participants have mixed motives that can manifest in all-things-considered reasons to deviate from contributing to the desired project, e.g., contexts with collective action problems. Our theory is based on strategic equilibrium-based reasoning, which links the characterization of joint intention in terms of individual intentions with conditions on strategy profiles of the underlying strategic games. We use elements of equilibrium reasoning to construct a counterfactual account of joint intention in the mixed-motive contexts, which extends the reach of the notion of joint intention considerably beyond that of previous formulations.

Keywords: joint intention, equilibrium, collective action problems

Suggested Citation

Almendares, Nicholas and Landa, Dimitri, Mixed Motives in the Equilibrium View of Joint Intention (June 10, 2015). Philosophical Studies, vol. 173 no. 3, p. 733-755, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2628328

Nicholas Almendares (Contact Author)

Seton Hall Law School ( email )

One Newark Center
Newark, NJ 07102-5210
United States

Dimitri Landa

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics ( email )

715 Broadway
New York, NY 10003
United States

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