Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2628338
 


 



Targets' Tax Shelter Participation and Takeover Premiums


Travis Chow


Singapore Management University - School of Accountancy

Kenneth J. Klassen


University of Waterloo - School of Accounting and Finance

Yanju Liu


Singapore Management University - School of Accountancy

June 17, 2015

Singapore Management University School of Accountancy Research Paper No. 2015-36

Abstract:     
This paper examines the effect of targets’ participation in tax shelters on takeover premiums in mergers and acquisitions. Using a novel dataset in which targets disclose that they have not participated in tax shelters, we find that targets that make this statement in their merger filings are associated with 4.6 percent higher takeover premiums, on average. This relation is consistent with acquirers being are concerned about the potential future liabilities when targets have engaged in tax sheltering. Consistent with this interpretation, the positive association between targets’ non sheltering disclosure and acquisition premiums is stronger for less tax aggressive acquirers. This paper demonstrates the importance of targets’ aggressive tax positions in the determination of premiums offered to targets’ shareholders.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 64

Keywords: tax sheltering, tax aggressiveness, takeover premium

JEL Classification: G34, H25, K34


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Date posted: July 9, 2015  

Suggested Citation

Chow, Travis and Klassen, Kenneth J. and Liu, Yanju, Targets' Tax Shelter Participation and Takeover Premiums (June 17, 2015). Singapore Management University School of Accountancy Research Paper No. 2015-36. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2628338 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2628338

Contact Information

Travis Chow
Singapore Management University - School of Accountancy ( email )
60 Stamford Road
Singapore 178900
Singapore
+65 6808 5450 (Phone)

Kenneth Klassen (Contact Author)
University of Waterloo - School of Accounting and Finance ( email )
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1
Canada
519-888-4567 x38550 (Phone)
519-888-7562 (Fax)
Yanju Liu
Singapore Management University - School of Accountancy ( email )
60 Stamford Road
Singapore 178900
Singapore

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