Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629193
 


 



Legal Perspectives on Client Clearing


Joanne P. Braithwaite


London School of Economics - Law Department

June 15, 2015

LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 14/2015

Abstract:     
The post-crisis global regulatory regime for the over-the-counter ('OTC') derivatives markets mandates the use of central counterparties ('CCPs'). CCPs serve markets by becoming buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer. Two techniques, selective membership and collecting margin, are central to CCPs working safely. The objective of this article is to use a legal perspective to consider how G20-led reforms to the OTC markets interact with, and complicate, these two techniques. The article starts by establishing that arrangements allowing CCP members to access clearing service for their clients (‘client clearing’) will become increasingly important as a result of regulatory reform, because parties unwilling or unable to become members will now require access. The article then demonstrates how client clearing complicates the legal underpinnings of CCPs, in particular as they relate to the provision of margin. The problematic interaction between the new clearing regime and the UK rules on client assets is considered as an example. The article concludes that these legal complexities need to be addressed at EU level in order to safeguard the functions that attracted regulators to clearing in the first place.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: August 18, 2015  

Suggested Citation

Braithwaite, Joanne P., Legal Perspectives on Client Clearing (June 15, 2015). LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 14/2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629193 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2629193

Contact Information

Joanne P. Braithwaite (Contact Author)
London School of Economics - Law Department ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 556
Downloads: 174
Download Rank: 132,506
People who downloaded this paper also downloaded:
1. Failure of the Clearinghouse: Dodd-Frank's Fatal Flaw?
By Stephen Lubben