Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (Second Version)

33 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2006

See all articles by Leonardo Felli

Leonardo Felli

London School of Economics - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Luca Anderlini

Georgetown University - Department of Economics

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Abstract

We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract they draw up. Ex-post the court observes whether an unforeseen contingency occurred, and decides whether to void or uphold the contract. If the contract is voided by the court, the parties can renegotiate a new agreement ex-post. There are two effects of a court that voids more contracts. The parties' incentives to undertake relationship-specific investment are reduced, while the parties enjoy greater insurance against the unforeseen contingencies which the ex-ante contract cannot take into account. In this context, we are able to characterize fully the optimal decision rule for the court. The behavior of the optimal court is determined by the tradeoff between the need for incentives and the gains from insurance that voiding in some circumstances offers to the agents.

Note: An updated version of this paper can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=873633

Keywords: courts of law, unforeseen contingencies, precedents, incentives, insurance

JEL Classification: C79, D74, D89, K40, L14

Suggested Citation

Felli, Leonardo and Anderlini, Luca and Postlewaite, Andrew, Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (Second Version). USC CLEO Research Paper No. C02-4; PIER Working Paper No. 06-001 ; Univ. of Pennsylvania, Institue for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-15; Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Advance Acces, September 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=263023 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.263023

Leonardo Felli (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7955 7525 (Phone)
+44 20 7831 1840 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/lfelli/index_own.html

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Luca Anderlini

Georgetown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-6361 (Phone)
202-687-6102 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/la2/

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7350 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~apostlew

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
358
rank
81,177
Abstract Views
4,036
PlumX Metrics
!

Under construction: SSRN citations while be offline until July when we will launch a brand new and improved citations service, check here for more details.

For more information