Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=263041
 
 

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Trading and Voting


David K. Musto


University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department

Bilge Yilmaz


University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department

January 16, 2001

Rodney L. White Fin. Research Working Paper No. 22-00

Abstract:     
The political choice between candidates with different redistribution policies plays out very differently in a complete financial market. When voters have the opportunity to trade election-contingent securities, we find that 1) wealth considerations have no effect on voting, so the interaction between candidates' redistribution policies and the distribution of wealth has no effect on who wins, 2) an election in which a candidate promises wealth redistribution results in redistribution of wealth, and the redistribution is the same regardless of who wins, and 3) if one candidate prefers some amount of redistribution and the other does not, the candidate who prefers redistribution will propose more redistribution than the amount he prefers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15


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Date posted: March 12, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Musto, David K. and Yilmaz, Bilge, Trading and Voting (January 16, 2001). Rodney L. White Fin. Research Working Paper No. 22-00. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=263041 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.263041

Contact Information

David K. Musto (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )
The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Bilge Yilmaz
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )
The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-1163 (Phone)
215-898-6200 (Fax)

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