Shadow Banking System in China after the Global Financial Crisis: Why Shadow Banks Can Distort the Capital Market Order
Peking University Law Journal, Vol. 3(2) (2015), pp 361-384
21 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2015 Last revised: 11 Mar 2016
Date Written: June 3, 2015
This article first examines the composition of the shadow banking system in China and then critically analyses its interconnectivity with the traditional banking system and global capital markets. It argues that whilst shadow bank lending in China contributes to the country’s economic growth, the normal functionality of capital markets could be impaired if shadow banks continue to operate on a high-risk/high-yield business model which could potentially pose a systemic risk. It also addresses the concerns arising from high-leverage shadow bank lending practice and cautions against shadow banks operating in a black hole area that enables them to escape from regulatory purview. The article suggests that future regulatory (law) reform should guide shadow banks towards consumer protection by establishing an effective internal control system, enabling sufficient risk controls and requiring material information disclosure; towards safeguarding capital markets; and towards reducing their high levels of leverage.
Keywords: shadow banking, China, capital market, global financial crisis
JEL Classification: E44, E63
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation