The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands

22 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2015

Date Written: July 16, 2015

Abstract

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can form if an only if payoff demands are feasible as in the Nash (1953) demand game. After smoothing the game (as in Van Damme (1991)), when the noise vanishes, when the discount factor is close to 1, and as in Okada's (2011), the coalitional Nash bargaining solution is the unique stationary subgameperfect equilibrium.

Keywords: Coalitional Bargaining, Nash Program, Simultaneous Payoff, Demands, Uncertainty

JEL Classification: C71, C72, C78

Suggested Citation

Nieva, Ricardo, The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands (July 16, 2015). FEEM Working Paper No. 067.2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2631555 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2631555

Ricardo Nieva (Contact Author)

Universidad de Lima ( email )

Av. Javier Prado Este, cuadra 46 s/n Monterrico, L
Lima, Lima
Peru

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