Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains

Posted: 1 Jun 2001

Abstract

Numerous commentators on local government law have advocated some form of regionalization to address metropolitan problems. These recommendations emanate from a conception of local governments, particularly suburbs, as isolated, self-interested entities that ignore or exploit the plight of their neighbors, particularly central cities. In this Article, Professor Gillette posits both a justification for decentralized entities and a more sanguine relationship among localities within a region. Analogizing from the literature concerning firms that form long-term contractual relationships, he contends that neighboring localities may be sufficiently interdependent that they have significant incentives to cooperate through interlocal contracts that realize economies of scale or that share regional distributional burdens. He suggests that any underutilization of interlocal contract depends less on suburban disinterest or exploitation than on contracting costs and legal obstacles that do not as readily affect interfirm relationships. Thus, problems attributed by advocates of regionalization to excessive localism may best be redressed through institutional arrangements that reduce contracting costs. Nevertheless, he argues that some costs inherent in regional burden-sharing contracts, such as the observability and verifiability of contract breaches, may be irreducible. He concludes, therefore, that some contracting costs that are endemic in interlocal relations are best circumvented through informal cooperative bargains that avoid problems of monitoring and enforcement.

JEL Classification: H1, H7

Suggested Citation

Gillette, Clayton P., Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=263289

Clayton P. Gillette (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6749 (Phone)
212-995-4692 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://rb.gy/b28bu6

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