Analyzing Robinson-Patman

38 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2015 Last revised: 15 Jan 2016

See all articles by D. Daniel Sokol

D. Daniel Sokol

University of Florida Levin College of Law

Date Written: August 1, 2015


The Robinson-Patman Act protects inefficient competitors rather than consumers. The possibility of a suit brought under Robinson-Patman increases the costs of efficient competitors. Robinson-Patman shifts the benefit of antitrust law from consumers to less efficient competitors. As such, the Act is fundamentally in tension with contemporary antitrust policy. This Essay explores the history of Robinson-Patman, empirically analyzes shifts in Robinson-Patman caselaw, and discusses how the FTC may have aided (or not) the change in legal outcomes of Robinson-Patman cases.

Keywords: Robinson Patman, antitrust, vertical restraints

JEL Classification: K21, L42

Suggested Citation

Sokol, D. Daniel, Analyzing Robinson-Patman (August 1, 2015). 83 George Washington Law Review 2064 (2015) ; University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 15-22. Available at SSRN:

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)

University of Florida Levin College of Law ( email )

Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)


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