Who Wins When Exchanges Compete? Evidence from Competition after Euro Conversion

Review of Finance, Forthcoming

58 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2015 Last revised: 4 May 2017

See all articles by Kathryn L. Dewenter

Kathryn L. Dewenter

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business

Xi Han

San Francisco State University - Department of Finance

Jennifer L. Koski

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business

Date Written: May 1, 2017

Abstract

Using euro conversion as the trigger, we examine what drives volume and spread changes when stock exchanges compete. Results show average trading costs on European exchanges decrease almost 9%, and turnover increases over 30%. Trading costs decline or remain unchanged on all exchanges, but volume deteriorates in some markets and improves in others. Frankfurt, Paris, London and Milan are winners, while Madrid and Brussels lose volume. We examine the role of the spread-volume relation, firm characteristics, exchange trading rules, and country-level factors in determining these outcomes. Results suggest that euro conversion prompted competition by increasing transparency in market prices.

Keywords: Exchange competition, Euro adoption, Transparency, Trading costs, Volume

JEL Classification: G15, F36, G12

Suggested Citation

Dewenter, Kathryn L. and Han, Xi and Koski, Jennifer Lynch, Who Wins When Exchanges Compete? Evidence from Competition after Euro Conversion (May 1, 2017). Review of Finance, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2634080 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2634080

Kathryn L. Dewenter (Contact Author)

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business ( email )

Box 353200
Dept. of Finance & Business Economics
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States
206-685-7893 (Phone)
206-685-9392 (Fax)

Xi Han

San Francisco State University - Department of Finance ( email )

1600 Holloway Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94132-1722
United States

Jennifer Lynch Koski

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business ( email )

Box 353226
Seattle, WA 98195-3226
United States
206-543-7975 (Phone)
206-685-9392 (Fax)

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