A Regulatory Approach to Demand Reduction in the Illegal Wildlife Market

23 Pages Posted: 22 Jul 2015

See all articles by Julie M. Ayling

Julie M. Ayling

RegNet School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University; European University Institute Dept of Law

Date Written: 2015

Abstract

Demand reduction has now been recognised as crucial to prevention of wildlife crime, but ideas for effectively decreasing demand are still in short supply. Two demand reduction strategies currently predominate, consumer education campaigns and legal prohibitions on consumption. But further strategies need to be found urgently, as Earth is losing wildlife at frightening rates. This paper argues for greater regulatory pluralism and a more systematic approach to addressing demand. The complex and multi-layered concept of demand is unpacked and current demand reduction activities by states and non-state actors are discussed. The paper identifies third parties (non-state non-offending actors) in prime positions to intervene to reduce demand and sets out diverse ways in which their capacities could be harnessed as part of a whole-of-society demand reduction response.

Keywords: Illegal wildlife trade, demand reduction, regulation, regulatory pluralism, non-state actors, third parties, consumer education.

JEL Classification: K42, Q3

Suggested Citation

Ayling, Julie M. and Ayling, Julie M., A Regulatory Approach to Demand Reduction in the Illegal Wildlife Market (2015). RegNet Research Paper No. 2015/82, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2634303 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2634303

Julie M. Ayling (Contact Author)

European University Institute Dept of Law ( email )

Via Bolognese 156 (Villa Salviati)
I-50139 Firenze
Italy

RegNet School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University ( email )

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia

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