Are Tax Havens Good? Implications of the Crackdown on Secrecy

SAFE Working Paper No. 111

19 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2015

See all articles by Alfons J. Weichenrieder

Alfons J. Weichenrieder

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Applied Econometrics and International Economic Policy; Vienna University of Economics and Business; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Fangying Xu

Goethe University Frankfurt

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2015

Abstract

The pressure on tax haven countries to engage in tax information exchange shows first effects on capital markets. Empirical research suggests that investors do react to information exchange and partially withdraw from previous secrecy jurisdictions that open up to information exchange. While some of the economic literature emphasizes possible positive effects of tax havens, the present paper argues that proponents of positive effects may have started from questionable premises, in particular when it comes to the effects that tax havens have for emerging markets like China and India.

Keywords: Tax haven, secrecy, tax information exchange, China, India

JEL Classification: H2, H7

Suggested Citation

Weichenrieder, Alfons J. and Xu, Fangying, Are Tax Havens Good? Implications of the Crackdown on Secrecy (July 2015). SAFE Working Paper No. 111. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2634402 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2634402

Alfons J. Weichenrieder (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Applied Econometrics and International Economic Policy ( email )

United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.uni-frankfurt.de/fb02/weichenrieder/

Vienna University of Economics and Business ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, Wien 1020
Austria

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Fangying Xu

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

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