The Existential Search of the European Banking Authority

49 Pages Posted: 6 Aug 2015 Last revised: 19 Aug 2015

See all articles by Eilis Ferran

Eilis Ferran

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: July 7, 2015

Abstract

The European Banking Authority (EBA), an EU agency that works to ensure effective and consistent prudential regulation and supervision across the European banking sector as a whole, was established several years before the European Central Bank (ECB) became responsible for the prudential supervision of Euro area banks. The ECB’s assumption of supervisory responsibilities has prompted searching questions about whether the EBA can continue to add value. The EBA could function as the bridge between the ECB and the supervisory authorities of the remaining Member States and, as such, could help to preserve the integrity of the Single Market. This article locates the EBA’s prospects for success in this role more in its ability to manage co-existence than to direct the conduct of supervision. The inquiry is placed within lines of governance scholarship that have moved away from simple “command and control” models to more complex frameworks. The inquiry is supported by detailed examination of the EBA’s performance in key areas, including rule-making, interpretation, and stress testing. Close study reveals that the EBA cannot be expected significantly to prove its value on the supervisory side through its use of formal intervention powers because these powers are an uneasy fit with its hybrid structure and governance arrangements. This finding does not mean that the EBA is incapacitated: rather, the fact that its effectiveness relies more on facilitation than on threats suggests that the EBA is actually well-equipped to make progress in its unifying role.

Keywords: financial regulation, EU, governance

JEL Classification: G18, G20, G28, K23, P48

Suggested Citation

Ferran, Eilis, The Existential Search of the European Banking Authority (July 7, 2015). University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 40/2015 ; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 297/2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2634904 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2634904

Eilis Ferran (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )

10 West Road
Cambridge CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom
+ 44 1223 338335 (Phone)
+ 44 1223 338340 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

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