Preemption in Capacity and Price Determination: A Study of Endogenous Timing of Decisions for Homogeneous Markets

29 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2001

See all articles by Werner Güth

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; Luiss Guido Carli University

Sandra Gueth

University of Bielefeld

Date Written: June 2000

Abstract

Endogenous timing can help to derive the time structure of decision making instead of assuming it as exogenously given. In our study we consider a homogeneous market where, like in the model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), sellers determine sales capacities before prices. Sellers must serve customers, but at higher costs when demand exceeds capacitiy. Our model allows for preemption in capacity as well as in price determination. Since preemption means to decide before the random choice of cost parameters reflecting the stochastic nature of (excess) capacity costs, preemptive commitments are no obviously better timing dispositions.

JEL Classification: D4, D8, D2, L1

Suggested Citation

Güth, Werner and Gueth, Sandra, Preemption in Capacity and Price Determination: A Study of Endogenous Timing of Decisions for Homogeneous Markets (June 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=263522 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.263522

Werner Güth (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

Sandra Gueth

University of Bielefeld

ZiF, Wellenberg 1
Department of Economics
33615 Bielefeld
Germany

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