Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635686
 


 



Product Quality and the Value of Asymmetric Information Under Supplier-Speci fied Contracts


Narendra Singh


Indian School of Business; Indian School of Business

Stelios Kavadias


University of Cambridge - Judge Business School

Ravi   Subramanian


Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business

July 24, 2015


Abstract:     
Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) sometimes face the decision of whether to make a critical component for a product in-house or to source it from a supplier. Though sourcing from a supplier with a more favorable cost structure than the OEM would be more efficient for the supply chain, the supplier could be in a position to specify contract terms and thus leave a lower share of the profit for the OEM. In this paper, we investigate implications of the relative cost efficiencies of the supplier and the OEM's in-house option on the OEM's choice of product design quality and on contract outcomes. We model the problem as a dynamic game, wherein the OEM chooses product quality (determined by the design quality of a critical component), followed by the supplier offering a contract for supplying the component. The OEM either accepts the supplier’s offer or uses her in-house option, and sells the product to consumers. Interestingly, we find that the supplier’s ability to offer a two-part tariff contract, compared to the price-only contract, may hurt not only the OEM (as expected) but also the supplier. We also investigate the impact of asymmetric information regarding the cost structure of the OEM’s in-house option. Counterintuitively, we show that, under certain conditions, asymmetric information may be desirable not only for the OEM, but also for the supplier -- the less-informed player.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: product quality; supply chain contracting; asymmetric information; signaling


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Date posted: July 26, 2015 ; Last revised: October 29, 2015

Suggested Citation

Singh, Narendra and Kavadias, Stelios and Subramanian, Ravi  , Product Quality and the Value of Asymmetric Information Under Supplier-Speci fied Contracts (July 24, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635686 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2635686

Contact Information

Narendra Singh (Contact Author)
Indian School of Business ( email )
Hyderabad, Gachibowli 500 019
India

Indian School of Business ( email )
Sector 81, Knowledge City
Mohali, 140306
India

Stylianos Kavadias
University of Cambridge - Judge Business School ( email )
Trumpington Street
Cambridge, Cambridgeshire CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/research/kavadiass.html

Ravi   Subramanian
Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business ( email )
800 West Peachtree St. NW
Atlanta, GA 30332
United States

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