The Symmetric Equilibria of Symmetric Voter Participation Games with Complete Information

25 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2015 Last revised: 10 Jun 2016

Georg Nöldeke

University of Basel

Jorge Peña

Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse

Date Written: June 10, 2016

Abstract

We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). To do so, we use methods based on polynomials in Bernstein form to determine how the probability that a voter is pivotal depends on the participation probability and the number of players in the game.

Keywords: Costly voting, Participation games, Mixed strategy equilibrium, Polynomials in Bernstein form

JEL Classification: C72, D72

Suggested Citation

Nöldeke, Georg and Peña, Jorge, The Symmetric Equilibria of Symmetric Voter Participation Games with Complete Information (June 10, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635697 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2635697

Georg Nöldeke (Contact Author)

University of Basel ( email )

Peter Merian-Weg 6
Basel, 4002
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/georgnoldeke/

Jorge Peña

Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse ( email )

31015 Toulouse, Cedex 6
France

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