Timing Information Flows

42 Pages Posted: 29 Jul 2015

See all articles by Gabriele Gratton

Gabriele Gratton

UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics

Richard Holden

University of New South Wales (UNSW)

Anton Kolotilin

University of New South Wales (UNSW)

Date Written: July 27, 2015

Abstract

At an exogenous deadline, Receiver must take an action, the payoff of which depends on Sender’s private binary type. Sender privately observes whether and when an opportunity to start a public flow of information about her type arrives. She then chooses when to seize this opportunity. Starting the information flow earlier exposes to greater scrutiny but signals credibility. We characterize the set of equilibria and show that Sender always delays the information flow and completely withholds it with strictly positive probability. Focusing on the stable equilibrium, we derive comparative statics, and discuss implications for organizations, politics, and financial markets.

Keywords: information disclosure, strategic timing, Bayesian learning, credibility vs. scrutiny

JEL Classification: D72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Gratton, Gabriele and Holden, Richard and Kolotilin, Anton, Timing Information Flows (July 27, 2015). UNSW Business School Research Paper No. 2015ECON16. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2636122 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2636122

Gabriele Gratton (Contact Author)

UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics ( email )

High Street
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

Richard Holden

University of New South Wales (UNSW) ( email )

Kensington
High St
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

Anton Kolotilin

University of New South Wales (UNSW) ( email )

Kensington
High St
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
59
Abstract Views
585
rank
384,191
PlumX Metrics