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Investing in Legal Advice: Competition at the Courthouse?

28 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2015 Last revised: 17 Jan 2016

Steffen Juranek

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science

Date Written: December 2, 2015

Abstract

I study the resource spending decision of plaintiffs in patent lawsuits. I use a unique sample of US patent litigation cases and focus on an important decision of the plaintiffs; their decision to hire external counsels.

I show that plaintiffs hire significantly more counsels the closer they compete with the defendants on the product market. Hence, the competitive situation on the product market is reflected in the plaintiff's enforcement strategy. Furthermore, the litigant's size is positively correlated with the number of counsels hired by the plaintiff; a result that identifies a channel for the observations that patents owned by large firms are less likely to be litigated.

Keywords: litigation, patents, strategic value, competition, litigant status

JEL Classification: K00, K41, O34

Suggested Citation

Juranek, Steffen, Investing in Legal Advice: Competition at the Courthouse? (December 2, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2636274 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2636274

Steffen Juranek (Contact Author)

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science ( email )

Helleveien 30
Bergen, NO-5045
Norway

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