Can Auditors Predict the Choices Made by Other Auditors?

Posted: 29 Mar 2001 Last revised: 12 Jun 2013

See all articles by Hun-Tong Tan

Hun-Tong Tan

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University

Karim Jamal

University of Alberta - Department of Accounting, Operations & Information Systems

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2001

Abstract

An implicit assumption of prior literature on strategic behavior of auditors is that auditors know the preferences of their colleagues. In this study, we conduct an experiment to investigate the validity of this assumption. In our experiment, we match a manager with a pair of top and mediocre audit seniors, as assessed by their firm. Each auditor predicts the choices that will be made by other auditors on two tasks that differ in their level of ambiguity. Our results show no difference in the accuracy among managers, top seniors, and mediocre seniors when they predict the choices made by specific individual auditors for both tasks. When predicting the number of managers and seniors who will choose a specific option on the high-ambiguity task, managers outperform top seniors, who in turn outperform mediocre seniors. For the low-ambiguity task, we find no difference among managers, top seniors, and mediocre seniors. Our results provide some limited support for models of strategic auditor behavior, and indicate that the ability to predict the choices of others is a dimension of an auditor's expertise.

Keywords: Audit expertis, Strategic auditor behavior, Auditor preference

JEL Classification: M49

Suggested Citation

Tan, Hun-Tong and Jamal, Karim, Can Auditors Predict the Choices Made by Other Auditors? (2001). Journal of Accounting Research, Volume 39, Issue 3, pp. 583-597, December 2001, University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper 2013-1019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=263714

Hun-Tong Tan

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University ( email )

Singapore, 639798
Singapore
+65 6790 4819 (Phone)
+65 6793 7956 (Fax)

Karim Jamal (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Department of Accounting, Operations & Information Systems ( email )

Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada
780-492-5829 (Phone)
780-492-3325 (Fax)

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