Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination: Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements

Posted: 30 Jul 2015

Date Written: July 25, 2015

Abstract

I examine the role of bank monitoring in the timing of earnings announcements. Managers have been shown to procrastinate and delay the public release of bad news on earnings. I find that banks discipline and prevent such managerial procrastination of earnings disclosures to the public. Moreover, I find that the market is more tolerant of delays in the public release of earnings information in the presence of a bank lending relationship. Thus, the negative abnormal return accompanying late releases of earnings information is observed only when a bank lending relationship is not present.

Keywords: Bank Monitoring, Lending Relationships, Earnings Announcement

JEL Classification: G21, G30

Suggested Citation

Su, Chih-Huei (Debby), Bank Monitoring and Managerial Procrastination: Evidence from the Timing of Earnings Announcements (July 25, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2637194 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2637194

Chih-Huei (Debby) Su (Contact Author)

University of New Mexico ( email )

MSC 05-3090
U of New Mexico
Albuquerque, NM 87131
United States

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