Employment Arbitration after the Revolution

35 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2015 Last revised: 18 Aug 2015

See all articles by David Horton

David Horton

University of California, Davis - School of Law

Andrea Chandrasekher

University of California, Davis - School of Law

Date Written: July 29, 2015

Abstract

This invited contribution to the DePaul Law Review’s Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy examines 5,883 cases initiated by employees in the American Arbitration Association between July 1, 2009 and December 31, 2013. Its goal is to shed light on the state of employment arbitration after the U.S. Supreme Court’s watershed opinions in Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.

It finds that employees have filed fewer cases since Concepcion. It also determines that employees “win” — defined as recovering an award of $1 or more — 18% of matters. Finally, it performs logit regressions to investigate the impact of several variables on case outcomes. It concludes that employees are less likely to be victorious when they face a “high-level” or “super” repeat playing employer. Conversely, fact that a case involves a “repeat pairing” — an employer that has appeared at least once before the same arbitrator — does not influence win rates.

Keywords: arbitration, FAA, employment, Gilmer, Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, AT&T v. Concepcion, empirical, class action, class arbitration, repeat player

Suggested Citation

Horton, David and Chandrasekher, Andrea, Employment Arbitration after the Revolution (July 29, 2015). DePaul Law Review, Vol. 65, 2016 Forthcoming, UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 443, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2637364

David Horton (Contact Author)

University of California, Davis - School of Law ( email )

Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall
Davis, CA CA 95616-5201
United States

Andrea Chandrasekher

University of California, Davis - School of Law ( email )

Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall
Davis, CA CA 95616-5201
United States

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