Discussion of 'The Revolving Door and the SEC's Enforcement Outcomes: Initial Evidence from Civil Litigation' by deHaan, Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal (2015)

20 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2015

See all articles by Rachel M. Hayes

Rachel M. Hayes

University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business

Date Written: July 23, 2015

Abstract

The study by deHaan et al. (2015) provides an empirical analysis of the effects of revolving door incentives at the SEC. Using a sample of SEC lawyers prosecuting civil cases of accounting misrepresentation, the authors examine how three measures of enforcement outcomes are related to the lawyers’ career paths. I discuss specific elements of the study’s research design, including the measurement of the study’s two key elements, revolving door incentives and regulatory oversight, and comment on the paper’s findings. While the study is interesting and creative, I believe its limitations are too great to allow for meaningful conclusions.

Keywords: SEC, enforcement, revolving door, financial reporting, human capital

JEL Classification: G38, M4

Suggested Citation

Hayes, Rachel M., Discussion of 'The Revolving Door and the SEC's Enforcement Outcomes: Initial Evidence from Civil Litigation' by deHaan, Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal (2015) (July 23, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2637610 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2637610

Rachel M. Hayes (Contact Author)

University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business ( email )

1645 E Campus Center Dr
Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9303
United States

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