Charter School Entry and School Choice: The Case of Washington, D.C

64 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

Date Written: July 29, 2015

Abstract

This paper develops and estimates an equilibrium model of charter school entry and school choice. In the model, households choose among public, private, and charter schools, and a regulator authorizes charter entry and mandates charter exit. The model is estimated for Washington, D.C. According to the estimates, charters generate net social gains by providing additional school options, and they benefit non-white, low-income, and middle-school students the most. Further, policies that raise the supply of prospective charter entrants in combination with high authorization standards enhance social welfare.

Keywords: Educational Institutions & Facilities, Education Finance, Economics of Education

Suggested Citation

Ferreyra, Maria Marta and Kosenok, Grigory, Charter School Entry and School Choice: The Case of Washington, D.C (July 29, 2015). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7383. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2637703

Maria Marta Ferreyra (Contact Author)

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Grigory Kosenok

New Economic School ( email )

47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
Suite 1721
117418 Moscow
Russia

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