Nash-Implementation of the No-Envy Solution on Symmetric Domains of Economies

15 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2015 Last revised: 7 Jun 2016

See all articles by Battal Doğan

Battal Doğan

Department of Economics, University of Bristol

Date Written: June 6, 2016

Abstract

We show that a simple game form, which resembles the "Divide-and-Choose" procedure, Nash-implements the no-envy solution on domains of economies where the set of feasible allocations is symmetric (an allocation obtained from a feasible allocation by interchanging the bundles of two agents is also feasible) and preferences are complete (each agent can compare any two bundles). Our result extends a result by Thomson, and it is applicable to a wide class of models including the classical model of fair allocation, the unidimensional single-peaked model, cake division model, and allocation of indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We show that, even when the preferences exhibit consumption externalities, an extension of the no-envy solution is Nash-implementable on general domains of economies.

Keywords: No-envy, Nash-implementation, Divide-and-Transpose

JEL Classification: C72, D63

Suggested Citation

Doğan, Battal, Nash-Implementation of the No-Envy Solution on Symmetric Domains of Economies (June 6, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2637965 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2637965

Battal Doğan (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, University of Bristol ( email )

United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
105
Abstract Views
564
rank
342,937
PlumX Metrics