Trust, Values, and False Consensus

27 Pages Posted: 31 Jul 2015

See all articles by Paola Giuliano

Paola Giuliano

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Jeffrey V. Butler

Dept. of Economics, University of California, Merced

Luigi Guiso

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2015

Abstract

Individuals’ beliefs about the trustworthiness of a generic member of the population are both heterogeneous across individuals and persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that the relationship between behavior and beliefs is consistent with individuals extrapolating their trust beliefs from their own trustworthiness and that this tendency continues even after substantial learning opportunities. We go on to provide evidence suggesting that one's own trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing.

Suggested Citation

Giuliano, Paola and Butler, Jeffrey Vincent and Guiso, Luigi, Trust, Values, and False Consensus (August 2015). International Economic Review, Vol. 56, Issue 3, pp. 889-915, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2638130 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12125

Paola Giuliano

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Jeffrey Vincent Butler (Contact Author)

Dept. of Economics, University of California, Merced ( email )

5200 N. Lake Road
Merced, CA 95343
United States

HOME PAGE: http://jeffreyvbutler.org

Luigi Guiso

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Sallustiana 62
Rome, 00187
Italy
+39 06 4792 4858 (Phone)
+39 06 4792 4872 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.eief.it/faculty-visitors/faculty-a-z/luigi-guiso/

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