The Effects of Israeli Use of Coercive and Conciliatory Tactics on Palestinian's Use of Terrorist Tactics: 2000-2006

Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, Volume 6, 2013

Posted: 4 Aug 2015

See all articles by Keren Sharvit

Keren Sharvit

Independent

Arie W. Kruglanski

University of Maryland - Department of Psychology

Mo Wang

University of Florida - Department of Management

Xiaoyan Chen

Independent

Boaz Ganor

Independent

Eitan Azani

Independent

Date Written: September 2013

Abstract

The study investigated the effects of Israel's use of offensive, defensive and conciliatory tactics on Palestinian's use of terrorist tactics. Proportional hazard modeling assessed the effects of Israeli tactics on total terrorist activity by Palestinians, suicidal and non-suicidal acts of terror, and acts of terror attributed to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and factions affiliated with Fatah. Palestinian acts of terror decreased following the construction of the separation fence, but increased during Operation Defensive Shield (ODS). However, the effects of various Israeli tactics differed for the different groups. Targeted assassinations increased Hamas terrorist activity, increased PIJ activity only if highly senior persons were targeted, and had no immediate effect on terrorist activity by Fatah-affiliated factions. ODS increased terrorist activity by Fatah-affiliated factions but had no effect on Hamas and PIJ. Several conciliatory measures were followed by periods of no terrorist activity at all by Hamas and Fatah-affiliated factions. The findings highlight the importance of considering the responses of different terrorist groups when evaluating effects of counterterrorist tactics.

Keywords: Israel, Palestinians, terrorism, counterterrorism, coercive, conciliatory

Suggested Citation

Sharvit, Keren and Kruglanski, Arie W. and Wang, Mo and Chen, Xiaoyan and Ganor, Boaz and Azani, Eitan, The Effects of Israeli Use of Coercive and Conciliatory Tactics on Palestinian's Use of Terrorist Tactics: 2000-2006 (September 2013). Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, Volume 6, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2639286

Keren Sharvit

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

Arie W. Kruglanski

University of Maryland - Department of Psychology ( email )

United States

Mo Wang (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Department of Management ( email )

United States

Xiaoyan Chen

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

Boaz Ganor

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

Eitan Azani

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
155
PlumX Metrics