Introduction to: Jet Symposium Issue on 'Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design'

42 Pages Posted: 6 Aug 2015

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Alessandro Pavan

Northwestern University

Date Written: August 4, 2015

Abstract

The Introduction to the Symposium Issue on “Dynamic Contract and Mechanism Design” of the Journal of Economic Theory provides an overview of the dynamic mechanism design literature. We then introduce the papers that are contained in the Symposium issue and finally conclude by discussing avenues for future research. Several of the papers contained in the Symposium issue were presented at the Economic Theory Workshop of the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University in June 2013.

Keywords: Dynamic mechanism design, Dynamic contracts

JEL Classification: D44, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Pavan, Alessandro, Introduction to: Jet Symposium Issue on 'Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design' (August 4, 2015). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2639691 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2639691

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Alessandro Pavan

Northwestern University ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-2600
United States
847-491-8266 (Phone)
847-491-7001 (Fax)

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