Product Market Regulation and Labor Market Outcomes: How Can Deregulation Create Jobs?

22 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2001

See all articles by Michael C. Burda

Michael C. Burda

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: January 2000

Abstract

This paper reports on ongoing research on the interactions between product regulation and labor market outcomes. In particular, I summarize work on the employment effects of shop-closing regulation in the retail and other related sectors. Evidence on employment in the retail sector from Germany, the Netherlands and the United States suggests that the regulatory regime might play an important role; I argue that a nonnegligible component of the recent Dutch employment miracle could be attributed to product market deregulation, in particular liberalization of shop-closing laws effected in the mid-1990s. I sketch a model, based on Burda and Weil (1999), which can rationalize potential public interest aspects of such regulations as well as identify their employment and output costs.

JEL Classification: D62, J22, L81

Suggested Citation

Burda, Michael C., Product Market Regulation and Labor Market Outcomes: How Can Deregulation Create Jobs? (January 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=263976 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.263976

Michael C. Burda (Contact Author)

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics ( email )

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