The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks

108 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2001

See all articles by Christopher Avery

Christopher Avery

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Christine Jolls

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Yale Law School

Richard A. Posner

University of Chicago Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alvin E. Roth

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Dept. of Economics, Stanford University

Abstract

In September 1998, the Judicial Conference of the United States abandoned its latest attempt to regulate the timing of interviews and offers in the law clerk selection process. This paper surveys the further unraveling of the market since then, makes comparisons with other entry level professional labor markets, and evaluates some possibilities for reform.

JEL Classification: J44, J41, K00, K40

Suggested Citation

Avery, Christopher and Jolls, Christine and Jolls, Christine and Posner, Richard A. and Roth, Alvin E. and Roth, Alvin E., The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=263988 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.263988

Christopher Avery (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Christine Jolls

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Yale Law School ( email )

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Richard A. Posner

University of Chicago Law School ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Alvin E. Roth

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Dept. of Economics, Stanford University ( email )

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