Enhancing the Common European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin

Study for the European Parliament, LIBE Committee, 2015

93 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2015

See all articles by Elspeth Guild

Elspeth Guild

Radboud University Nijmegen - Faculty of Law; Kingsley Napley - Department of Immigration; The British Institute of International and Comparative Law; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Cathryn Costello

University College Dublin (UCD); University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; University of Oxford - Refugee Studies Centre; Hertie School

Madeline Garlick

Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)

Prof. Violeta Moreno-Lax

Queen Mary Law School

Sergio Carrera

Centre for European Policy Studies

Date Written: July 15, 2015

Abstract

Upon request by the LIBE committee, this study examines the reasons why the Dublin system of allocation of responsibility for asylum seekers does not work effectively from the viewpoint of Member States or asylum-seekers. It argues that as long as it is based on the use of coercion against asylum seekers, it cannot serve as an effective tool to address existing imbalances in the allocation of responsibilities among Member States. The EU is faced with two substantial challenges: first, how to prevent unsafe journeys and risks to the lives of people seeking international protection in the EU; and secondly, how to organise the distribution of related responsibilities and costs among the Member States. This study addresses these issues with recommendations aimed at resolving current practical, legal and policy problems.

Keywords: EU, Asylum, Refugee, Safe access, Dublin Regulation

Suggested Citation

Guild, Elspeth and Costello, Cathryn and Costello, Cathryn and Garlick, Madeline and Moreno-Lax, Violeta and Carrera, Sergio, Enhancing the Common European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin (July 15, 2015). Study for the European Parliament, LIBE Committee, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2640526

Elspeth Guild (Contact Author)

Radboud University Nijmegen - Faculty of Law ( email )

Postbus 9049
6500 KK Nijmegen
Netherlands
024-3611357 (Phone)
024-3611423 (Fax)

Kingsley Napley - Department of Immigration ( email )

Knight's Quarter
14 St. John's Lane
London EC1M 4AJ
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7814 1200 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 7490 2288 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.kingsleynapley.co.uk/our-people/the-partners/elspeth-guild.htm

The British Institute of International and Comparative Law ( email )

Charles Clore House
17 Russell Square
London WC1B 5JP
United Kingdom

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Cathryn Costello

University College Dublin (UCD) ( email )

Belfield
Belfield, Dublin 4 4
Ireland

HOME PAGE: http://https://people.ucd.ie/cathryn.costello

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )

St. Cross Building
St. Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UJ
United Kingdom

University of Oxford - Refugee Studies Centre ( email )

Oxford Department of International Development
32 Mansfield Road
Oxford, OX13TB
United Kingdom

Hertie School ( email )

Berlin, 30123
Germany

Madeline Garlick

Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)

1 Place du Congres, 1000
Brussels, 1000
Belgium

Violeta Moreno-Lax

Queen Mary Law School ( email )

Mile End Road
London, London E1 4NS
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk/staff/morenolax.html

Sergio Carrera

Centre for European Policy Studies ( email )

1 Place du Congres
B-1000 Brussels, 1000
Belgium
+32 2 229 39 26 (Phone)

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