Holding Members of Transnational Terrorist Groups Accountable Under Article 25 of the Rome Statute: Effectiveness, Legitimacy and Impact

Abstract

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has not yet had to consider the application of the Rome Statute to terrorist groups with a network-based organisational structure. This article examines whether members of transnational terrorist groups can be held accountable under Article 25 of the Rome Statute despite their network-based organisational structure. In order for a member of a transnational terrorist group to be held accountable under Article 25 we need to ascertain whether their conduct satisfies the constituent elements of the doctrine of direct and indirect co-perpetration as developed by the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers in the Lubanga and Katanga cases.

Notwithstanding that the doctrine of co-perpetration is an attempt to develop an overall theory of accountability at the ICC the concept of control under the doctrine is one-dimensional especially when applied to entities such as transnational terrorist groups which may not have a centralised command in view of their network-based organisational structure. This article will propose that a more inclusive approach to joint perpetration which includes both objective and subjective elements would be more appropriate.

Keywords: Transnational terrorism Groups; International Criminal Court; Rome Statute, Accountability, Article 25, Lubanga, Katanga