Public-Good Provision, Mechanism Design and Voting

29 Pages Posted: 11 Aug 2015

See all articles by Felix J. Bierbrauer

Felix J. Bierbrauer

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Martin F. Hellwig

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Bonn - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 11, 2015

Abstract

We study the relation between mechanism design and voting in public-good provision. If incentive mechanisms must satisfy conditions of coalition-proofness and robustness, as well as individual incentive compatibility, the participants' contributions to public-good provision can only depend on the level of the public good that is provided and that level can only depend on the population shares of people favouring one level over another. For a public good that comes as a single indivisible unit the outcome depends on whether or not the share of votes in favour of provision exceeds a specified threshold. With more provision levels for the public good more complicated mechanisms can be used but they still involve the counting of votes rather than any measurement of the participants' willingness to pay. The paper thus provides a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms.

Keywords: Mechanism Design, Public-good provision, Voting Mechanisms

JEL Classification: D82, H41, D70, D60

Suggested Citation

Bierbrauer, Felix J. and Hellwig, Martin F., Public-Good Provision, Mechanism Design and Voting (August 11, 2015). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2015/11. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2642151 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2642151

Felix J. Bierbrauer

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Martin F. Hellwig (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

University of Bonn - Department of Economics

Adenauerallee 24-42
D-53113 Bonn
Germany

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
63
Abstract Views
477
rank
361,431
PlumX Metrics