From Mixed Economy to Entangled Political Economy: A Paretian Social-Theoretic Orientation

32 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2015

See all articles by Meg Tuszynski

Meg Tuszynski

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - O’Neil Center for Global Markets and Freedom

Richard E. Wagner

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 11, 2015

Abstract

This paper compares and contrasts two visions of political economy. These visions aren’t antagonistic, just different. The mixed economy vision associated with Ludwig von Mises and Sanford Ikeda treats politics as intervening into markets. The entangled political economy vision treats politics and markets as overlapping subsystems within a society. Entangled political economy thus descends from a theory of society and social processes. Similarly to quantum entanglement where the state of a particle cannot be described independently of that of other particles, entanglement in political economy means that rational market action cannot be defined independently of rational political action. The focal point of entangled political economy, moreover, is on individual actors and their search for gain within different action environments. Interaction among individuals across those environments generates societal tectonics, thereby adding insights from Vilfredo Pareto about social theory to those of Mises and Ikeda about interventionism.

Keywords: dynamics of intervention; mixed economy; entangled political economy; Vilfredo Pareto; social theory; societal tectonics; non-logical action; political entrepreneurship

JEL Classification: D23, D50, L32, P16

Suggested Citation

Tuszynski, Meg and Wagner, Richard E., From Mixed Economy to Entangled Political Economy: A Paretian Social-Theoretic Orientation (August 11, 2015). Public Choice, Vol. 164, No. 2, 2015; GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 15-36. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2642531

Meg Tuszynski

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - O’Neil Center for Global Markets and Freedom ( email )

United States

Richard E. Wagner (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
334 Enterprise Hall
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
(703) 993-1132 (Phone)

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