Extended Shareholder Liability as a Means to Constrain Moral Hazard in Insured Banks
30 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2015 Last revised: 5 Mar 2017
Date Written: March 24, 2016
We explore extended liability for bank shareholders as a method for mitigating moral hazard in insured banks. The dominant approach to maintaining financial stability employs piecemeal regulations concerning specific bank behaviors; we propose this difficult practice can be sidestepped by embracing a legal environment where banks face healthier incentives. We discuss the various kinds of extended liability regimes, show how they worked historically, and address several concerns about the potential downsides of these regimes. We conclude by discussing how extended liability can be used to avoid the difficulties of both ‘microprudential’ and ‘macroprudential’ approaches to systemic stability.
Keywords: Bagehot Hypothesis, deposit insurance, double liability, moral hazard, triple liability, unlimited liability
JEL Classification: E42, E44, G21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation