Shareholder Primacy and Stakeholders' Interests in the Aftermath of a Takeover: A Review of Empirical Evidence

International Business Law Journal (2015), Iss 2, pp. 161-186

26 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2015 Last revised: 21 Sep 2018

See all articles by Chrispas Nyombi

Chrispas Nyombi

Canterbury Christ Church University; Canterbury Christ Church University

Tom Mortimer

University of Bedfordshire

Rhidian Lewis

University of Bedfordshire

Georgios Zouridakis

University of Essex

Date Written: March 15, 2015

Abstract

Since the takeover of Cadbury Plc in 2010, there has been increased academic attention on investor short-termism during takeovers and whether the continued imposition of the board neutrality rule has made it easy to acquire UK companies. This paper contributes to this growing body of research by examining existing empirical studies to determine whether concerns over short-termism and the continued imposition of the board neutrality rule are justified.

Keywords: Takeovers, Employment, Board Neutrality Rule, Takeover Code 2006, Cadbury, Kraft, Rule 21

Suggested Citation

Nyombi, Chrispas and Nyombi, Chrispas and Mortimer, Tom and Lewis, Rhidian and Zouridakis, Georgios, Shareholder Primacy and Stakeholders' Interests in the Aftermath of a Takeover: A Review of Empirical Evidence (March 15, 2015). International Business Law Journal (2015), Iss 2, pp. 161-186, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2645086

Chrispas Nyombi (Contact Author)

Canterbury Christ Church University ( email )

North Holmes Road
Canterbury, Kent CT1 1QU
United Kingdom

Canterbury Christ Church University ( email )

United Kingdom

Tom Mortimer

University of Bedfordshire ( email )

Vicarage St
Luton, LU1 3JU
United Kingdom

Rhidian Lewis

University of Bedfordshire ( email )

Vicarage St
Luton, LU1 3JU
United Kingdom

Georgios Zouridakis

University of Essex ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

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