Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences

25 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2015

See all articles by Tomoya Kazumura

Tomoya Kazumura

University of Tokyo - Graduate School of Economics

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Date Written: August 17, 2015

Abstract

Consider the problem of allocating objects to agents and how much they should pay. Each agent has a preference relation over pairs of a set of objects and a payment. Preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects. This paper is to investigate the possibility of designing efficient and strategy-proof rules in such environments. A preference relation is single demand if an agent wishes to receive at most one object; it is multi demand if whenever an agent receives one object, an additional object makes him better off. We show that if a domain contains all the single demand preferences and at least one multi demand preference relation, and there are more agents than objects, then no rule satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers on the domain.

Keywords: strategy-proofness, efficiency, multi demand preferences, single demand preferences, non-quasi-linear preferences, minimum price Walrasian rule

JEL Classification: D44, D71, D61, D82

Suggested Citation

Kazumura, Tomoya and Serizawa, Shigehiro, Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences (August 17, 2015). ISER Discussion Paper No. 943, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2646436

Tomoya Kazumura (Contact Author)

University of Tokyo - Graduate School of Economics ( email )

Tokyo
Japan

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
+81 6 6879 8558 (Phone)
+81 6 6878 2766 (Fax)

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