A New Model of Clientelism: Political Parties, Public Resources, and Private Contributors

Forthcoming in European Political Science Review

27 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2015

See all articles by Sergiu Gherghina

Sergiu Gherghina

University of Glasgow

Clara Volintiru

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Date Written: 2015

Abstract

The study of clientelism has pointed in the direction of a pyramid structure in which selective benefits are distributed with the help of brokers to individuals or groups in exchange for political support. This approach treats the resources aimed to enhance electoral mobilization as endogenous and fails to explain what happens when brokers have very low capacity. To address these problems this article proposes a bi-dimensional model of clientelism that emphasizes the role of exogenous resources. Accordingly, the vertical linkage between political parties and electorate is complemented by a horizontal nexus between parties and private contributors. In an environment characterized by low internal resources, parties involve external actors to get the necessary money. To illustrate how this mechanism works we focus on Romania between 2008 and 2012, a crucial case for the study of clientelism.

Keywords: clientelism, horizontal linkage, private contributors, public resources, Romania

Suggested Citation

Gherghina, Sergiu and Volintiru, Clara, A New Model of Clientelism: Political Parties, Public Resources, and Private Contributors (2015). Forthcoming in European Political Science Review, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2648915

Sergiu Gherghina (Contact Author)

University of Glasgow ( email )

Bute Gardens
Adam Smith Building
Glasgow, G12 8RT
United Kingdom

Clara Volintiru

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

London

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