Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered

FinanzArchiv, Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 394-411, 2000

Posted: 17 Apr 2001

See all articles by Patrick W. Schmitz

Patrick W. Schmitz

University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

In this paper it is argued that privatization is not the only alternative to public ownership. Adopting the incomplete contract approach, it is shown that partial privatization, i.e. joint ownership, may well turn out to be the optimal property rights regime, if the trade-offs that have been emphasized in the privatization context (see Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, Quarterly Journal of Economics (1997)) are taken into account. While in the standard incomplete contract model joint ownership is often dominated, it is shown here that joint ownership in the form of partial privatization can be optimal since it mitigates the disadvantages of public ownership (no incentives to improve quality if the manager invests or too strong incentives if the government invests) and of privatization (too strong incentives for the manager to reduce costs).

Note: This is a description of the article and not the actual abstract.

Keywords: Partial privatization, incomplete contracts, property rights, joint ownership

JEL Classification: L33, H82, D23

Suggested Citation

Schmitz, Patrick W., Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered. FinanzArchiv, Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 394-411, 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=264968

Patrick W. Schmitz (Contact Author)

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://schmitz.uni-koeln.de/index.php?s=mitarbeiter&t=schmitz

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
1,036
PlumX Metrics