The Theory and Practice of Corporate Voting at U.S. Public Companies

The Research Handbook of Shareholder Power, edited by Jennifer Hill and Randall Thomas, Edgar Elgar, 2015, Forthcoming

Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 15-18

33 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2015

See all articles by Paul H. Edelman

Paul H. Edelman

Vanderbilt University - Law School

Randall S. Thomas

Vanderbilt University - Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: August 25, 2015

Abstract

This paper develops a comprehensive theory of corporate voting and its role in corporate governance for U.S. public corporations. We begin by addressing why shareholders should vote, and then ask why no other stakeholders vote. We finish the first part of the paper by examining what shareholders should vote on. In Section II we discuss the implications of empty voting for our theory. Section III examines the current system of corporate voting in the U.S. to see how it conforms to our theory. We finish with some brief conclusions.

Keywords: Corporate Voting

JEL Classification: G30, K22

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Paul H. and Thomas, Randall S., The Theory and Practice of Corporate Voting at U.S. Public Companies (August 25, 2015). The Research Handbook of Shareholder Power, edited by Jennifer Hill and Randall Thomas, Edgar Elgar, 2015, Forthcoming; Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 15-18. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2650661

Paul H. Edelman (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States
615-322-0990 (Phone)
615-322-6631 (Fax)

Randall S. Thomas

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

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