Ownership Structure and Stock Market Liquidity

Posted: 14 May 1998

See all articles by Atulya Sarin

Atulya Sarin

Santa Clara University - Department of Finance

Karen Shastri

Katz Graduate of Business

Kuldeep Shastri

University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group

Date Written: May 1996

Abstract

We empirically examine the relationship between liquidity and the fraction of the firm owned by insiders and institutions. The bid-ask spread is a direct cost of transacting and we use it as one measure of stock liquidity. Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) point out that, in addition to bid-ask spread, quoted depth is also part of the stock market quote and that specialists actively manage adverse selection risk by adjusting both spread and depth. We find that both higher insider and institutional ownership are associated with wider spread and smaller quoted depth. Our results also suggest that for higher insider ownership the loss of liquidity is a consequence of adverse selection costs and for higher institutional ownership is a result of higher inventory carrying costs.

JEL Classification: G12, G32

Suggested Citation

Sarin, Atulya and Shastri, Karen Andrea and Shastri, Kuldeep, Ownership Structure and Stock Market Liquidity (May 1996). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2652

Atulya Sarin (Contact Author)

Santa Clara University - Department of Finance ( email )

Leavey School of Business and Administration
Santa Clara, CA 95053
United States
408-554-4953 (Phone)
408-904-4498 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://business.scu.edu/asarin

Karen Andrea Shastri

Katz Graduate of Business ( email )

University of Pittsburgh
Mervis Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States
412-648-1533 (Phone)
412-648-1693 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: www.pitt.edu/~karen

Kuldeep Shastri

University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group ( email )

372 Mervis Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States
412-648-1708 (Phone)
412-648-1693 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.pitt.edu/~ks112354

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