From Integrity Agency to Accountability Network: The Political Economy of Public Sector Oversight in Canada

63 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2015 Last revised: 30 Aug 2015

See all articles by Jamie Baxter

Jamie Baxter

Dalhousie University - Schulich School of Law; Yale University - Law School

Date Written: August 10, 2015

Abstract

The federal integrity agencies that are delegated collective responsibility for public sector oversight in Canada face a common challenge to stabilize their ongoing independence from political control. While Parliament has delegated to these agencies key oversight functions that demand some degree of structural independence, they remain vulnerable to shifting political preferences and to an increasingly partisan national politics. This Article uses a political economy framework to theorize the objectives that shape political preferences for agency independence in Canada, and to suggest that structural innovations in the form of 'accountability networks' may provide one strategy to help stabilize those preferences over the long run.

Keywords: Administrative justice, independence, delegation, principal-agent, Integrity agencies, Officers of Parliament

JEL Classification: K00, K23

Suggested Citation

Baxter, Jamie, From Integrity Agency to Accountability Network: The Political Economy of Public Sector Oversight in Canada (August 10, 2015). Ottawa Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2652319

Jamie Baxter (Contact Author)

Dalhousie University - Schulich School of Law ( email )

6061 University Avenue
6061 University Ave
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 4H9
Canada

Yale University - Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States

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