Insider Trading and Market Structure

66 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2015 Last revised: 31 Jul 2016

See all articles by Yesha Yadav

Yesha Yadav

Vanderbilt University - Law School

Date Written: August 28, 2015

Abstract

This Article argues that the emergence of algorithmic trading raises a new challenge for the law and policy of insider trading. It shows that securities markets comprise a cohort of algorithmic “structural insiders” that – by virtue of speed and physical proximity to exchanges – systematically gain first access to information and play an outsize role in price formation. This Article makes three contributions. First, it introduces and develops the concept of structural insider trading. Securities markets increasingly rely on automated traders utilizing algorithms – or pre-programmed electronic instructions – for trading. Policy allows traders to enjoy important structural advantages: (i) to physically locate on or next to an exchange, shortening the time it takes for information to travel to and from the marketplace; and (ii) to receive feeds of richly detailed data directly to these co-located trading operations. With algorithms sophisticated enough to respond instantly and independently to new information, co-located automated traders can receive and trade on not-fully-public information ahead of other investors. Secondly, this Article shows that structural insider trading exhibits harms that are substantially similar to those regulated under conventional theories of corporate insider trading. Structural insiders place other investors at a persistent informational disadvantage. Through their first sight of market-moving data, structural insiders can capture the best trades and erode the profits of informed traders, reducing their incentives to participate in the marketplace. Despite the similarity in harms, however, this Article shows that doctrine does not apply to restrict structural insider trading. Rather, structural insiders thrive in full view and with regulatory permission. Thirdly, the Article explores the implications of structural insider trading for the theory and doctrine of insider trading. It shows them to be increasingly incoherent in their application. In protecting investors against one set of insiders but not another, law and policy appear under profound strain in the face of innovative markets.

Keywords: Fraud, Securities Regulation, Insider Trading, Co-location, Direct Feeds, Automation, Liability, Algorithmic Trading, High Frequency Trading, Negligence, Strict Liability, Damages, Rule 10b-5, Microstructure, Manipulation, Spoofing, Marking the Close

JEL Classification: G30, G32, G33, K12, K22, K41

Suggested Citation

Yadav, Yesha, Insider Trading and Market Structure (August 28, 2015). UCLA Law Review, Vol. 63, p. 968, 2016; Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 15-22. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2652895 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2652895

Yesha Yadav (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

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